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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






VIRGIN ISLANDS HOUSING AUTHORITY;  
  AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, 




  COASTAL GENERAL CONSTRUCTION SERVICES CORPORATION; 
  CHARLEY'S TRUCKING,  
    Coastal General Construction  
    Services Corporation, Appellant 
 
 
  COASTAL GENERAL CONSTRUCTION SERVICES  
 CORPORATION, 
      Appellant 
v. 
 
  AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION;  
  VIRGIN ISLANDS HOUSING AUTHORITY, 




APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN 
(D.C. Civ. Nos. 93-00039 & 93-00042)1 
___________ 
 
Argued April 22, 1994 
 
Before:  STAPLETON, ALITO, and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
   Filed June 24, 1994 
___________ 
 
Peter Goetz, Esquire (ARGUED) 
William B. Flynn, Esquire 
                                                           
1This Court's order entered April 5, 1994 amending the caption on 
motion of the Virgin Islands Housing Authority is vacated as 
improvidently granted.  The district court's order that was 
appealed and the notice of appeal by Coastal General Construction 
Services Corporation include the captions of both cases. 
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WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal, we hold that in the Virgin Islands, 
unless an independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists, a 
suit to confirm or vacate an arbitrator's award pursuant to the 
Federal Arbitration Act must be brought in the Territorial Court, 
not in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.  We also decide 
that an arbitrated dispute that is based on the breach of a 
construction contract growing out of a territorial housing 
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project financed by federal funds does not establish federal 
question jurisdiction.  Accordingly, we will reverse an order of 
the district court vacating an arbitrator's award.   
 Plaintiff Virgin Islands Housing Authority entered into 
a contract with defendant Coastal General Construction Services 
Corp. for renovation of the Donoe Housing Project on St. Thomas. 
Funding for the project was supplied by a program that receives 
part of its funding from the United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) under the Comprehensive Improvement 
Assistance Program, 42 U.S.C. 1437l (Supp. 1993). 
 The contract was executed on September 29, 1988, but no 
notice to proceed was issued.  The Housing Authority terminated 
the contract on June 6, 1989, as permitted by the terms of the 
agreement.  Contending that it was entitled to compensation for 
the work it had performed before the termination, Coastal 
submitted the matter for a hearing before the American 
Arbitration Association as provided in the contract. 
 On February 5, 1992, Coastal presented its claim for 
termination damages in the amount of $1,114,799.40 (amended on 
October 5, 1992 to be $1,149,922).  One day before the hearing 
scheduled for November 17, 1992, however, Coastal presented an 
amended claim in the amount of $2,343,933, almost double the 
amount it had previously requested.  At the beginning of the 
hearing, the Housing Authority asked the arbitrator to either 
disallow the latest amended claim or continue the hearing to 
allow time for further evaluation of the amount claimed.  The 
arbitrator did not postpone the hearing, and in its final written 
4 
argument to the arbitrator, the Housing Authority asserted that 
consideration of the amended claim was unfair and prejudicial. 
 After final submissions by the parties, the arbitrator 
awarded Coastal $1,262,049.  The Housing Authority filed suit in 
the Territorial Court seeking to vacate the arbitration award 
because of Coastal's alleged fraud in inflating its claim. 
Coastal then removed the case to the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, and filed a separate action in that forum seeking 
confirmation of the award.  The two cases were consolidated by an 
order that was originally limited to discovery.  However, the 
court and the parties treated the consolidation as applicable 
generally.     
 The District Court determined that it had federal 
question jurisdiction and denied the Housing Authority's motion 
for remand.  In a subsequent memorandum, the court found that 
Coastal's last-minute submission of an amended claim with its 
accompanying documentation presented sufficient cause for 
postponement and concluded that the arbitrator had improvidently 
closed the hearing.  Based on evidence that some of the expenses 
claimed by Coastal might have been inflated or completely false, 
the district court reasoned that the Housing Authority may have 
been prejudiced, vacated the award and "remanded for completion 
of the agreed upon arbitration."  Coastal has appealed. 
I. 
 The first question confronting us is whether the 
District Court's order is appealable.  We resolve this issue by 
reference to the statutory provisions of the Federal Arbitration 
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Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.  Section 16(a)(1) of the Act 
authorizes an immediate appeal from an order that (A) refuses a 
stay of an action under 9 U.S.C. § 3; (B) denies a petition to 
order arbitration to proceed; (C) refuses to compel arbitration; 
(D) confirms or denies confirmation of an award; or (E) modifies, 
corrects, or vacates an order.  Id. § 16(a)(1).  On the other 
hand, section 16(b) of the Act prohibits an appeal from 
interlocutory orders directing or permitting arbitration to 
proceed. 
 If the District Court had simply vacated the award in 
this case, the order would be clearly appealable under subsection 
16(a)(1)(E), but the additional direction for a remand has 
clouded the issue.  The appealability of such an order was 
discussed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit in Atlantic Aviation, Inc. v. EBM Group, Inc., 11 F.3d 
1276, 1280 (5th Cir. 1994).  That Court observed that the Federal 
Arbitration Act "does not distinguish between orders vacating 
arbitration awards without directing a rehearing and those orders 
which vacate awards and direct a rehearing of the arbitration 
dispute; both are appealable."  Id.    
 Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Texas, 915 
F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1990), presented a similar issue.  In that 
case, the district court found that the misrepresentation by one 
of the parties and the failure of the arbitrators to take any 
corrective action required that the award be vacated and the 
matter remanded to a new panel of arbitrators.  The Court of 
Appeals concluded that the order was appealable because otherwise 
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the parties could never determine whether the district court had 
complied with the narrow statutory limits governing vacatur.  Id. 
at 1020.  The Court stated in a footnote, however, that if the 
district court had simply remanded the case to the original 
arbitration panel for clarification of its award, "the policies 
disfavoring partial resolution by arbitration would preclude 
appellate intrusion until the arbitration was complete."  Id. at 
1020 n.1.   
 In the case before us, the District Court's order does 
not specify whether it is the original arbitrator who is to 
conduct the hearing on remand.  Even if that is the implication, 
however, we do not believe that the order is an interlocutory one 
within the scope of 9 U.S.C. § 16(b).  Here, the District Court 
did not simply request clarification, but instead directed a re-
evaluation of the entire controversy based on the Housing 
Authority's allegations that Coastal's claim for reimbursement 
was submitted with fraudulent documentation.   
 We are not convinced by the dictum in Forsythe that 
appealability in situations of this nature should be determined 
by whether the remand is to the original or a new arbitrator. 
Rather, the distinction is whether the additional hearing is 
ordered merely for purposes of clarification -- an order that 
would not be appealable -- or whether the remand constitutes a 
re-opening that would begin the arbitration all over again. Here, 
the vacation and remand order is essentially no different from 
that of the district courts in Atlantic Aviation and Forsythe 
where the Court of Appeals held that the orders were appealable.  
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We therefore follow the rulings in those cases and hold that we 
do have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. 
II. 
 Having found that the order is appealable, the next 
question is whether the District Court or the Territorial Court 
had jurisdiction over the Housing Authority's petition to vacate 
the arbitration award and Coastal's request for confirmation. 
 In Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1032-34 (3d Cir. 
1993), we discussed the division of jurisdiction between the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands and the Territorial Court. 
The opinion reviewed the history of the two courts as well as the 
congressional and local legislative enactments that resulted in 
the allocation of various forms of civil litigation between the 
two forums.  Id. 
 In brief, the Territorial Court has original 
jurisdiction over all local civil actions.  Id. at 1034; see 48 
U.S.C. § 1612(b); V.I. Code tit. 4, § 76(a).  The District Court 
of the Virgin Islands has exclusive jurisdiction equivalent to 
United States District Courts over such fields as admiralty, 
bankruptcy, patent, copyright and trademark, and other matters 
not relevant here.  Brow, 994 F.2d at 1034 (citing 48 U.S.C.  
§ 1612(a)).  The Territorial Court and the District Court have 
concurrent jurisdiction over federal question and diversity 
cases.  Id. 
 Because complete diversity of citizenship does not 
exist between the parties in this case, the jurisdiction of the 
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District Court cannot rest on that ground.2  Nor does this case 
involve those matters that would come within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the District Court.  That leaves for 
determination whether a federal question exists here to give the 
District Court jurisdiction.   
 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) gives district courts jurisdiction 
over "civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States."  The Supreme Court has explained 
that section 1331(a) authorizes the courts to hear either 
originally or by removal "only those cases in which a well-
pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the 
cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief 
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of 
federal law."  Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers 
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983); see also 13B Charles A. 
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3562, at 46 
(1984).  
 Removal jurisdiction exists only if the case could have 
been brought in the federal court under its original 
                                                           
2Coastal's complaint in the District Court named the American 
Arbitration Association and the Housing Authority as defendants. 
Because diversity of citizenship existed between Coastal and the 
Arbitration Association, Coastal asserted that the District Court 
had supplemental jurisdiction over the Housing Authority under 28 
U.S.C. § 1367.  That contention was an erroneous interpretation 
of section 1367 because that statute does not affect the 
traditional rule of complete diversity.  Even though Coastal 
chose the wrong route in its complaint, the District Court 
properly considered whether the suit raises a federal question to 
support jurisdiction on grounds other than diversity.  See 
Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1018 (3d Cir. 1991); 
see also 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1210, at 121 (1990).  
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jurisdiction.  Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 10.  Moreover, the 
fact that a defense based on federal law will be raised does not 
create jurisdiction in the federal courts unless the case falls 
within that small category where the governing federal statute 
preempts the field and was clearly intended to support removal 
jurisdiction.  See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 
58, 66-67 (1987).  That circumstance is not present here. 
 Federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction 
to enforce the provisions of the Arbitration Act.  In Moses H. 
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 
(1983), the Supreme Court observed that the "Arbitration Act is 
something of an anomaly" in federal court jurisdiction.  The 
statute creates federal substantive law regulating an agreement 
to arbitrate, but "it does not create any independent federal-
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . . . or otherwise." 
Id.  As we noted in Isidor Paiewonsky Assocs., Inc. v. Sharp 
Properties, Inc., 998 F.2d 145, 153 n.8 (3d Cir. 1993), the 
Arbitration Act does not supply federal jurisdiction where it 
does not otherwise exist.   
 The Arbitration Act thus does not answer the 
jurisdictional issue in the case at hand.  In Prudential-Bache 
Sec., Inc. v. Fitch, 966 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1992), a brokerage 
firm filed suit in federal court to compel arbitration of a 
dispute with its customer.  The underlying controversy arose over 
contentions that the brokerage firm had violated federal 
securities laws.  However, because the complaint did not include 
any reference to a federal statute other than the Arbitration 
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Act, the Court of Appeals followed the well-pleaded complaint 
rule and held that no federal question jurisdiction existed.  Id. 
at 988-89.  Prudential-Bache thus emphasizes that not only must 
federal jurisdiction exist aside from the Arbitration Act, but 
the independent basis must appear on the face of the complaint. 
 The record in the case at hand establishes that neither 
of the complaints filed by the Housing Authority and Coastal 
contain allegations sufficient under the well-pleaded complaint 
rule to support a finding of a substantial federal question.  On 
that basis alone, the District Court lacked jurisdiction. 
 Even if it were permissible to look beyond the 
complaint to the substance of the arbitrated dispute between the 
parties, we would still conclude that no federal question is 
present here.  The District Court concluded that it had 
jurisdiction based on four factors:  (1) enforcing or vacating 
the award implicates contractual obligations between HUD and the 
Housing Authority "with respect to the use of federal funds 
earmarked for the construction projects at issue in which funds 
Coastal has an interest"; (2) resolution of the dispute requires 
construction of HUD requirements for the termination of a 
contract and a federal interest exists in maintaining the uniform 
interpretation of federal contractual provisions; (3) the Housing 
Authority's allegations that Coastal had submitted fraudulent 
documentation with its claim required an interpretation of the 
Arbitration Act; and (4) judicial economy would be best served by 
not remanding because any appeal from the Territorial Court would 
be to the District Court.  
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 The last factor, judicial economy -- unfortunately as 
this case demonstrates -- cannot be a factor in determining the 
jurisdiction of federal courts.  The allocation of judicial 
business to the courts is a matter of constitutional and 
legislative mandates that must be honored by the courts 
regardless of considerations of efficiency. 
 Nor does the Housing Authority's claim that fraud 
occurred in the arbitration process confer jurisdiction on the 
District Court.  The Arbitration Act provides that a court may 
vacate an award that has been procured by fraud or where the 
arbitrator was guilty of misconduct in refusing a postponement of 
the hearing.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1), (3).  Nevertheless, as noted 
earlier, the Supreme Court made plain in Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hosp. that the Arbitration Act alone cannot serve as a basis for 
finding federal jurisdiction.  "[T]he substantive law the Act 
created [is] applicable in state and federal courts," Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984), but the Act does not 
supply independent federal question jurisdiction.  Id. at 15 n.9. 
 The possibility, therefore, that the court would be 
required to interpret the fraud provisions the Arbitration Act 
does not meet federal question standards; another independent 
basis of jurisdiction must exist.  As the Southland Court noted, 
"a party may assert general contract defenses such as fraud to 
avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement."  Id. at 16 n.11. 
That, however, like other general contract defenses does not 
establish federal jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act. 
12 
 We come, then, to the other two factors cited by the 
district court, namely that enforcing or vacating the award not 
only implicates contractual obligations between HUD and the 
Housing Authority with respect to the use of federal funds, but 
also that a resolution of the dispute requires an interpretation 
of HUD requirements for termination of a contract.  In this 
connection, the court noted the federal interest in maintaining a 
uniform interpretation of federal contract provisions. 
 We may assume, albeit hesitantly, that resolution of 
the dispute between Coastal and the Housing Authority would 
implicate these factors.  That assumption, however, does not 
supply the necessary independent basis for jurisdiction. 
Preliminarily, we note that the interest in uniformity in 
construction of federal contractual provisions is not enough to 
pose federal question issues.  Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. 
v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 815-16 (1986). 
 As we said in Lindy v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 1367, 1369 (3d 
Cir. 1974), an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) arises only if 
the complaint seeks a remedy expressly granted by federal law or 
if the action requires construction of a federal statute, or at 
least a distinctive policy of a federal statute requires the 
application of federal legal principles.  "[T]he fact that a 
contract is subject to federal regulation does not, in itself, 
demonstrate that Congress meant that all aspects of its 
performance or nonperformance are to be governed by federal law 
rather than by the state law applicable to similar contracts in 
businesses not under federal regulation."  Id.  
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 In Lindy, the dispute between the parties was focused 
on the correct interpretation and effect of contractual documents 
normally determined by state law.  We concluded that "[t]he fact 
that these documents were subject to the regulations of [a 
federal agency] is not significant . . . ."  Id.  
 The Court of Appeals in West 14th St. Commercial Corp. 
v. 5 W. 14th Owners Corp., 815 F.2d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 1987), 
outlined the two tests to be applied when reviewing federal 
question jurisdiction.  First, the question is whether federal 
law creates the cause of action.  If not, the second inquiry is 
whether the complaint poses a substantial federal question.  The 
Supreme Court has cautioned that "`the mere presence of a federal 
issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer 
federal question jurisdiction.'"  Id. at 193 (quoting Merrell 
Dow, 478 U.S. at 813).  The nature of the federal interest at 
stake is determinative of whether it is sufficiently substantial 
to displace state law.  Id.   
 In Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Housing Auth., 
797 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1986), HUD provided funds for construction 
of housing units by a Housing Authority for an Indian tribe.  A 
contractor sued the Housing Authority and asserted federal 
question jurisdiction.  The Court of Appeals rejected that 
assertion, holding that the contractor's claims were based on its 
agreement with the Housing Authority -- an interpretation of 
which was governed by local, not federal, law.  Id. at 672. "[The 
contractor's] action for money damages may have a connection with 
activities undertaken as part of functions authorized by federal 
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law, but did not itself arise under federal law and requires only 
the interpretation and application of contract principles under 
local law."  Id. at 675 n.8; see also Morongo Band of Mission 
Indians v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 
1385-86 (9th Cir. 1988) (In suit for breach of lease, fact that 
it was entered into under authority conferred by federal statute 
did not support federal question jurisdiction).    
 Even if Coastal's complaint contained assertions 
respecting the use of federal funds in the construction project 
and the adoption of contractual forms authorized by HUD, federal 
question jurisdiction would still not be established. 
Essentially, the dispute between the parties is whether the 
Housing Authority could terminate the contract without paying for 
the expenses that Coastal had incurred up to that point.  This 
dispute is thus governed by local, not federal, law.     
 The contract explicitly states that HUD is not a party 
to the agreement in this case.  Moreover, the agency 
understandably declined to participate in the arbitration 
proceedings.  Coastal does not seek money from HUD, but from the 
Housing Authority.  Nor has Coastal cited any HUD regulation or 
any statutory provision that would substantially affect the 
disposition of the claim against the Housing Authority.  In these 
circumstances, federal question jurisdiction would not exist even 
in the absence of the well-pleaded complaint rule. 
 We conclude, therefore, that the Territorial Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the Housing 
Authority and that removal to the District Court was improper. 
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Thus, the suit must be remanded to the Territorial Court. 
Similarly, because the Territorial Court also has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the action filed by Coastal, the district court 
must either dismiss that action or it may, "in the interest of 
justice," transfer the suit to the Territorial Court pursuant to 
the authority conferred in V.I. Code tit. 4, § 32(b).  See Brow, 
994 F.2d at 1037 n.10.   
 One final matter remains for determination.  The 
Housing Authority has requested that we impose sanctions against 
Coastal for its improvident removal of the litigation to the 
District Court.  Coastal had relied primarily upon a theory of 
allocation of jurisdiction between the District and Territorial 
Courts that was not clarified until this Court issued its opinion 
in Brow.  Because the removal took place before the date of that 
opinion, we conclude that Coastal had a colorable claim of 
jurisdiction at the time it began the removal action.  In these 
circumstances, we do not believe that sanctions would be 
appropriate. 
 The judgment of the District Court will be vacated, and 
the cases will be remanded to the District Court with directions 
to remand the suit brought by the Housing Authority to the 
Territorial Court and to dismiss or transfer the complaint filed 
by Coastal in the District Court.  Each party to bear its own 
costs.   
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